The article covers the analysis of the main recruitment channels for high-ranking officials of the plenipotentiary representative offices of the President of the Russian Federation in the federal districts. As the empirical basis of the study serves the biographical database, that includes information on 154 presidential bureaucrats as of April 2023. Recruitment of people from various socio-professional groups to the apparatus of the plenipotentiary representative offices reveals a number of trends caused by interacting push (specific features of the candidate's position and associated resources and interests) and pull (place in the power system and functional specialisation of the plenipotentiary representative offices, specifics of leadership positions in them, as elements of the opportunity structure, as well as personal connections) factors. One of the most important trends is militarisation: most officials of the plenipotentiary representative offices have work experience in law enforcement agencies and even spent there most of their previous careers. Recruiting security officials who are, in terms of career, “ideal-typical” federal officials and professionally socialised within the framework of rigid, centralised hierarchies probably strengthens the autonomy of the plenipotentiary representations from actors and interests external to federal power, including regional administrations, that these bodies are called upon to control. The logic of autonomisation is also in line with the fact that one of the main suppliers (especially direct) of key officials of the plenipotentiary representations is the Presidential Administration, first of all, the apparatus of the representations themselves. However, a significant minority of presidential officials have experience working in regional administrations (especially among deputies and assistants to plenipotentiaries), as well as in business, both public and private (especially among plenipotentiaries and their deputies). At the same time positions in these structures rarely serve as a direct springboard to a key position in the plenipotentiary representations. Finally, the role of legislative bodies as a channel for recruiting presidential officials is insignificant. In general, the author's findings are consistent with the results of previous studies, indicating the relative stability of recruitment trends.

Presidential Administration, presidential plenipotentiary representative’s office, career, recruitment, defense and law enforcement agencies, regional administration, business

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